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Abstract The general thesis of this paper is that the motives of the currently dominant
global educational governance are rooted in a specific cultural milieu in the time of the
Cold War, more precisely in the late 1950s, heading to a harmonious world. The more
specific thesis is that a series of failures in the achievement of this harmonized globe led to
reforms in educational governance, leading eventually to the development of instruments
like large-scale assessments, such as PISA. The concluding thesis of the paper is that
precisely because the idea of global governance is rooted in a specific culture, its instru-
ments run the risk of only affecting formal structures of education in other cultures rather
the inner activities of the ‘educational fabric’.
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In the past two or three decades we have been witnessing an ongoing worldwide assimi-
lation of the different national educational systems. This process has been promoted by
international organizations such as the World Bank or the International Monetary Fund
investing millions of dollars in the school systems of poorer countries on the condition that
organizational structures and governance systems that proved to be successful in the rich
countries are implemented. The effects of this global governance are quite tangible.
Sociologists describe this process as ‘‘world institutionalization of education’’ (Meyer and
Ramirez 2000) with standardized ideas about organizational structures, compulsory
schooling, curricula, and professionally trained teachers resulting in an educational ‘‘world
polity’’ (Meyer et al. 1994).
These developments have evoked criticism. Some critics depict educational policy
makers as being string puppets of the global economy and reducing students to measurable
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results. Other critics have argued that in any case the global dissemination of ideals, goals,
and means is limited only to formal structures—in other words to polity issues—and hardly
affect the inner activities of education, such as for example classroom instruction (Meyer
and Rowan 1977, 1978, 2000). The same critics have also pointed to the fact that this
form of globalization is to be understood as a spread of western ideas rather than a global
consensus between equal partners—ideas that were successful only because they were
promoted by the money provided by the different governmental and non-governmental
organizations and new international educational bureaucracies like UNESCO or UNICEF
(Chabbott 2003).
What is being criticized here on a global scale can well be applied to the west itself. The
western systems are by no means harmonized, but they, too, are on the way. It is sufficient
to mention the Bologna Process, aiming at the creation of a harmonized European Higher
Education Area by 2010, and similar attempts on lower school levels in single countries
with decentralized structures.1 Whereas on a global scale the World Bank and other
international organizations are the promoters of world polity, for the western sphere it is
the International Association for Educational Assessment (IAEA) and, most of all, the
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, the OECD, particularly with
its comparative testing instrument, the Program for International Student Assessment,
known as PISA.
I am interested in this process of harmonization and its assumed limitations to formal
structures of education and, conversely, in its weak capability to have the effects that it is
aiming for: namely, to improve formal education, respectively enhance school quality.
Within the limits of this paper, I will narrow my scope to the western world only and to its
most distinguished instrument, PISA. My general thesis is that the motives of the new
global educational governance are rooted in a specific cultural milieu in the time of the
Cold War, more precisely in the late 1950s, heading to a harmonious world. My more
specific thesis is that a series of failures in the achievement of this harmonized globe led to
reforms in educational governance, leading eventually to the development of instruments
like large-scale assessments, such as PISA. And my concluding thesis is that precisely
because the idea of global governance is rooted in a specific culture, its instruments run the
risk of only affecting formal structures of education in other cultures rather the inner
activities of the ‘educational fabric.’ I will develop my theses in five steps. First, I will
analyze some characteristics of PISA as prominent tokens in the harmonizing of the
educational globe. Then I will focus on the emergence of these characteristics in the
context of the 1950s and its vision of global development. In the third step I will recon-
struct how the shock of Sputnik led to educationalization of this global vision and focus on
the major agency of this concept, the OECD. In the fourth step I will illustrate how the
failure of the educational initiatives led to a new governance model in which standardized
large-scale testing emerged as the chief instrument in educational governance. I will close
my paper by asking what challenges await educational research in the face of these
global-political developments defining research primarily as supplier of needed policy
information.
1 Countries with de-centralized educational policies like Germany or Switzerland are trying to harmonize
primary education through specific institutions such as the Conference of the German Cultural Ministers
(Kultusministerkonferenz) and the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Education (Schweizerische
Konferenz der Kantonalen Erziehungsdirektoren).
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PISA and the Harmonization of the Educational Globe
PISA’s basic concern is to measure how well 15 year-old adults are prepared to meet the
‘‘challenges of today’s knowledge society’’ (OECD 2001, p. 14). However, what these
‘‘challenges’’ are and what ‘‘today’s knowledge society’’ means are not defined. The reader
learns that these assumed challenges could be mastered successfully with specific com-
petencies. Since only competencies in science, mathematics and language are tested, one
has to assume that competencies in these areas are crucial to coping with the unidentified
challenges.
Besides the distinction between allegedly important and allegedly less important
competencies, PISA makes a distinction between useful and useless knowledge. There is
knowledge that is ‘‘merely learned,’’ and there is learned knowledge than can be used in
the future life of the students (OECD 2001, p. 14). Again, the distinction is not elucidated,
but it is nevertheless crucial. Because PISA wants to look at ‘‘young people’s ability to use
their knowledge and skills in order to meet real-life-situations,’’ the focus is not directed at
what students learn in school on the basis of their curriculum and textbooks (p. 16). PISA
pretends to know what young people need to master their lives in the future, but at the same
time it neglects the question of how students master their lives in their very own present—
namely, as learning students at school. ‘‘Assessments that test only mastery of the school
curriculum can offer a measure of the internal efficiency of school systems. They do not
reveal how effectively schools prepare students for life after they have completed their
formal education’’ (p. 27).
As an empirical research design PISA knows that it cannot disregard student experi-
ences, even though it disregards the concrete context of these experiences: the real school,
its curriculum, its textbooks, etc. In an odd construction PISA offers the following solution
out of this problem: ‘‘PISA offers a new approach to considering school outcomes, using as
its evidence base the experiences of students across the world rather than in the specific
cultural context of a single country’’ (p. 27). However, the disregard of the national
curriculum, organization, and textbooks does not stop PISA from thinking of its results as
being essential to the particular national educational policies. Without these results, PISA
says, parents, taxpayers, and politicians ‘‘lack a means of judging the comparative effec-
tiveness of their educational systems’’ (p. 18).
Comparisons are always and as a matter of principle normative. ‘‘Normative’’ means
that facts are being related to an ideal standard or model. ‘‘Comparative’’ means that
different facts are related to the same ideal standard or model—philosophers talk about the
tertium comparitionis as the basic principle of comparison. Regarding achievements,
different variables such as the curriculum, the textbooks, the actual lessons, and the quality
of the teachers could be considered, and of course it is only fair to account for the family
background of the students, too. All these variables composing the tertium comparitionis of
the comparison are fundamentally empirical, but PISA does not consider them in its
comparison of achievement. It is only after the results have been engendered, after the
comparison of cognitive achievement, that PISA turns its interest to some of the empirical
questions such as family background, gender, or school structures. The question is where
this tertium comparitionis originates and how it gained such a broad legitimacy, rightly or
not. As I mentioned in the introduction, my general thesis is that its origins can be found in
the Cold War ideology of the 1950s.
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The Vision of ‘‘One World,’’ the Experts, and the Ideology of Development
After the Second World War, few Americans doubted the supremacy of their nation
leading the world to enduring peace and welfare. In this context the notion of ‘‘One
World’’ became popular. It had been used as early as 1943 by the presidential candidate
Wendell Lewis Willkie, and it indicated the idea of a safe and united world based on the
security and well-being of common people throughout the world, provided by U.S. world
leadership (Fousek 2000, p. 79). Annoyingly, one of the former allies, the Soviet Union,
had expressed similar ambitions on its own agenda and had thus become more and more a
distracting factor on the global vision of ‘‘One World’’ under the leadership of the United
States.
In order to tackle the Soviets’ agenda, leading intellectuals in the United States
constructed an important distinction. The communist ambitions of a united and just
world of equal citizens were labeled ‘‘ideological,’’ while the western self-perception
was deemed to be free of ideology. In this context the phrase ‘‘the end of ideology’’
became a popular slogan to rally intellectuals worldwide against the Soviet Union’s
postwar ideological offense (Gilman 2003, p. 58). This very same idea returned in
1989, by the way, when Francis Fukuyama proclaimed the ‘‘end of history’’ after the
fall of the Iron Curtain.
The self-ascription to be free of ideology was deduced from the self-assessment of being
the most developed country in the world. Looking at its own history, there was little doubt
that the United States had solved the major problems of modern societies by far the best.
But its self-asserted American exceptionalism did not prevent the rise of the idea that at
same time its unique example was universal and exemplary, too. In other words, the United
States were both unique and a model for others; it had something to offer the world by its
very example (Gilman 2003, p. 63). An expression of this ‘‘American nationalist global-
ism’’ (Fousek 2000) can be seen as early as in 1947 in the former vice-president of the
United States, Henry A. Wallace, saying: ‘‘By reason of history, geography and sheer
economic strength America has it in her grasp to furnish that great and last peace which the
prophets and sages have preached for thousands of years’’ (quoted in Fousek 2000, p. 11).
The religious language of salvation is not misleading but rather characteristic, as Denis
Brogan, a British commentator of the United States, noticed in 1957: ‘‘The notion of
‘mission’ is far wider than it was; the whole world is the parish of the United States as a
government and a culture’’ (quoted in Gilman 2003, p. 69).
The globalization of the American self-perception as world model free of ideology has
served in many international organizations as an indubitable benchmark, precisely because
it proclaimed to be universal. The key word of this millennium project was development.
This notion allowed the division of the world in three parts: first the developed countries,
thus the United States and to a lesser degree Western Europe, then the wrongly developed
countries, thus the communist, and last the former colonies as underdeveloped countries in
south-eastern Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America. Whereas there was little hope to
convince the communist leaders in the Soviet Union or in China of the dignity of the
western idea of the end of ideology, American leaders began to get more and more
involved in developing underdeveloped countries. The fact that the Soviet Union had the
same strategy for their vision of the end of class society caused the manifold problems
called the Cold War, with many proxy wars around the globe.
The project of developing underdeveloped countries was targeted at establishing an
industrial democracy based on the model of the United States. American experts advised local
authorities, if necessary in military affairs in order to prevent communist agitation—not
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always successful if we think of the Vietnam tragedy.2 The concept of the expert as a key actor
for development in both domestic and foreign affairs challenged the democratic tradition of
the United States that was traditionally characterized as grass-rooted. The attractiveness of
the expert as a leading figure originated from the perception of an increasing complex world
and the decreasing faith in popular regimes; Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union were seen as
possible degenerations of too popular governments that had to be bent forward. In this altered
understanding, democracy works essentially as a form of competition among elites for votes,
and therefore democracy is reduced to its procedural function of election. Not even high voter
participation in elections is been sought after, far from it: ‘‘That democracy is best, in which
people participate least’’ was the general assumption of the expertise-driven democracy in the
1950s (quoted in Gilman 2003, p. 48).
The idea of the expert goes along with the idea that major problems can be solved by
scientific means, technology, and rational planning. The impressive development in both
science and technology had been perceived as the result of a free people and thus as a core
part of the American world mission.3 Therefore, technology was not merely a technical
means but a visible token of the universal process towards ‘‘One World.’’ The atomic bomb
that helped to end the war in Japan was no more than the dot on the ‘i’ of the technological
sublime in the self-perception of the Americans (Nye 1994). As early as in 1949, President
Harry S. Truman said: ‘‘The United States is preeminent among nations in the development
of industrial and scientific techniques. The material resources which we can afford to use
for the assistance of other peoples are limited. But our imponderable resources in technical
knowledge are constantly growing and are inexhaustible. (…) Greater production is the key
to prosperity and peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous
application of modern scientific and technological knowledge’’ (quoted in Gilman 2003,
p. 71). Everything seemed to be basically in order, despite the Korean conflict, the Hun-
garian revolt, and the darkening situation in Vietnam—that is, until a 23-inch metal ball
called Sputnik was launched by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957. It was the first
human-made object to orbit the earth, and it symbolized the superiority of communist
technology. The cultural shock of Sputnik effected several immediate reactions. One was
the founding of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration NASA in 1958, and
another was the passage of the National Defense Education Act, or NDEA, by the U.S.
Congress the same year.
Sputnik and the Educationalization of Development: NDEA and OECD
The rational for the NDEA was as follows: ‘‘The Congress hereby finds and declares that
the security of the Nation requires the fullest development of the mental resources and
technical skills of its young men and women’’ (NDEA 1958, Sec. 101). As the ‘‘defense of
this Nation depends upon the mastery of modern techniques developed from complex
scientific principles,’’ the Congress argued, more young people should be educated in three
core subjects, namely in ‘‘science, mathematics and modern foreign languages and trained
2 ‘‘After the Korean War, the U.S. foreign economic aid program would become inseparable from military
concerns’’ (Gilman 2003, p. 44).
3 Not everywhere has this mission enjoyed undivided appreciation, not even in the western world. The
French journalist Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber attracted high attention in 1967 with the publication of his
book Le De´fi Ame´ricain (The American Challenge 1967), accusing the United States of colonizing Europe
by the technological advances. It was translated in 15 different languages and sold almost one million
copies.
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in technology’’ (ibid.). Through the lenses of PISA this selection looks quite normal, for
the only difference is that NDEA fosters foreign languages rather than the native language.
However, it is worthwhile to remember that in the eighteenth century, for instance, two of
those three subjects would not even be a part of the compulsory curriculum of the school—
namely, mathematics and science. By contrast, the most important subjects in mass
schooling of early modern times, the Catechism and religious songs, have disappeared in
this selection in the same way that history has disappeared, that important subject in
primary and secondary education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In other words,
what looks normal through the lenses of PISA only appears to us to be normal because the
Cold War educational policy is the very ground and origin of PISA.
The NDEA was a novelty insofar as for the first time in U.S. history the federal
government was interfering in educational affairs regarding specific curricular contents
(Sufrin 1963, p. 3). NDEA did not just want to support the local and state authorities to
educate students generally; instead, it connected financial aid to promotion of mathematics,
science, and foreign languages. This interference is a reflection of the above-mentioned
shift towards elite democracy and faith in experts. Until the NDEA, formal education
issues had been exclusively in the hands of state, district, and local school boards, who
were elected by popular vote. But in their attempt to change education in order to combat
the national threat by the Soviets, the Federal experts obviously challenged this local
model of democratic control. The instrument of this governmental interference was called
‘‘incentive,’’ a notion that has since made a career in educational policy as another notion
that described the legitimation of this interference, namely ‘‘excellence’’: ‘‘The NDEA
emphasizes the pursuit of excellence for the individual as the prime defense measure in
democracy’’ (Sufrin 1963, p. 16), as one of the defenders of NDEA said. The original two-
party ideology, development, and ‘‘One World’’ had become a three-party concept—
namely education, development, and ‘‘One World.’’ And it is this very model that was
adopted by the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD, and
spread all over the globe.
The OECD was founded in same year that the NDEA program for financial aid to the
applying schools started, in 1960. Its precursor organization had been the Organization for
European Economic Co-operation (OEEC), founded on April 16, 1948, emerging from the
Marshall Plan for rebuilding and creating a stronger foundation for the countries of
Western Europe, and repelling—according to the Truman’s Doctrine4—communism after
World War II. Its first meeting was held in 1961 in Washington, D.C. The new strategy of
the old endeavor to develop the ‘‘One World’’ can be detected in the title of the conference:
Policy Conference on Economic Growth and Investment in Education. Unmistakably, the
political motive behind the conference was the Soviet Union (OECD 1961, pp. 5, 18, 21);
the key to success was economic growth. Because education was thought to be a ‘‘key to
more rapid and more meaningful economic growth’’ in the ‘‘age of science’’ (pp. 19, 21),
failing education would cause a stammering economy and make the project of ‘‘One
4 President Harry Truman held his Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey—which
eventually became the so-called Truman Doctrine—on March 12, 1947. In this message he asked the
Congress for immediate financial aid for both Turkey and Greece, which were being threatened by com-
munist rebels. ‘‘The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in
the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of a people for a better life has
died. We must keep that hope alive. The free peoples of the world look to us for support in maintaining their
freedoms. If we falter in our leadership, we may endanger the peace of the world–and we shall surely
endanger the welfare of this Nation.’’ Truman was successful and was able to convince the Congress: Both
countries received several hundred millions of dollars from the U.S. government in 1947 (Truman 1947).
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World’’ impossible.5 However, the scope remained the whole world, not just the countries
of OECD. In the eyes of the actors, the ‘‘more advanced’’ countries owed help to the
‘‘underdeveloped areas to assess their present and long-term needs for education in relation
to economic and other development objectives’’ (p. 14).
A developing economy was still seen as the main engine towards the harmonization
of the globe, but—to stick to the metaphor—with the Sputnik shock, it was realized that
the engine needed fuel, and the fuel was educated people. In other words and briefly
stated, the great western project of harmonizing the world was educationalized. However,
the actors of this shift were by no means educationalists, quite on the contrary. As one of
the key speakers at the conference said, ‘‘May I say that, in this context, the fight for
education is too important to be left solely to the educators’’ (OECD 1961, p. 35).
Accordingly, the conference had brought together ‘‘those with policy responsibilities for
education and national budgets as well as professional economists and experts’’ (p. 9). Of
the four keynote speakers one was a lawyer (Dean Rusk, U.S. Secretary of State), the
second had received his university degree in political and social sciences (Thorkill
Kristensen, Secretary-General of the OECD), and the third and the fourth were econo-
mists by training (Philipp Coombs, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and
Cultural Affairs, and Walter H. Heller, Council of Economic Advisers to the President of
the United States).
Accordingly, the major theory that the members at the OECD conference were referring
to was not primarily an educational but an economic theory: human capital theory. Human
capital theory had been developed right in the wake of the Sputnik consternation and had
become highly attractive very quickly. The general postulate of human capital theory is
that education should be seen not primarily as expenditure but as investment with the
perspective of benefit. In other words, education has to be seen as investment in human
beings. ‘‘It is only very recent,’’ Theodore Schultz said in 1962, ‘‘that studies of human
investment have been undertaken. These studies all enter upon empirical research, in
particular to a separation of acquired from inherited capabilities’’ in relation to ‘‘economic
growth, structure of wages and salaries, and the distribution of personal income’’ (Schultz
1962, p. 8). Human capital theory is not restricted to the last of these three points, for it has
an overall scope: ‘‘Schooling benefits many persons other than the student. It benefits the
student’s future children, who will receive informal education in the home; and it benefits
neighbors, who may be affected favorably by the social values developed in children by the
schools and even by the quietness of the neighborhood while the schools are in session’’
(Weisbrod 1962, p. 197). The scope is still the one of earthly redemption to be achieved
with a major reform in perceiving the potentials of education: ‘‘Schools may be viewed as
firms that specialize in ‘producing’ schooling. The educational establishment, which
includes all schools, may be viewed as an industry’’ (Schultz 1963, p. 4).
The Reorganization of the Educationalization of Development: Output Steering
The 1961 recipe of both the NDEA and the OECD was what we call today ‘‘input
steering.’’ Education as investment meant improving teacher education, upgrading the
5 It was made clear that governments needed to invest more money in education in order to enforce both ‘‘a
new level of culture and human dignity’’ as essentials of a democracy and the advancement of science and
technology, because the ‘‘economic progress is itself increasingly dependent on the development of edu-
cation and on scientific research’’ (p. 5f., see pp. 9ff, 19, 21).
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curriculum and the textbooks in specific eras, and developing learning techniques and
‘‘learning machines’’ (OECD 1961, pp. 11f, 25). They decided that much more data
from the individual countries were needed in order to plan in detail educational
innovation for economical development. The ‘‘first importance for sound educational
planning and for the development of education programmes’’ was to collect ‘‘excellent
statistical data in respect of pupils, teachers, buildings and finance’’ in an ‘‘international
comparable way’’ (OECD 1961, p. 13).6 The general concept was quantitative, not
qualitative (ibid., p. 10).
Both characteristics of the major concept of securing development by enhanced edu-
cation, its input and its quantitative orientation, were reversed about 25 years later. The
turnaround to quality control and output steering was preceded by a new, costly, and
unsuccessful American campaign for better education after 1980. This campaign had been
triggered by traumatic events in the late 1960s and 1970s—the OPEC oil embargo, the
stock market crash, the Vietnam War disaster, the Watergate scandal, the Civil Rights
Movements and riots, the successful Japanese and then the Korean car industry, and
Ayatollah Khomeini’s forming of the explicitly anti-modern Islamic Republic of Iran.
Again, the anti-Soviet stimulus was used, when a professor of mathematics (Wirszup 1981)
complained in 1981 about ‘‘The Soviet Challenge. The new mathematics curriculum
required of all students in the U.S.S.R. is superior to that of any other country’’ and stated
that the ‘‘recent Soviet educational mobilization … poses a formidable challenge to the
national security of the United States’’ (p. 360). Based on meanwhile available compar-
ative international data provided by international organizations, further scholars witnessed
a ‘‘striking and highly significant… decline in mean scores’’ in ‘‘cognitive achievements’’
(Lerner 1982, pp. 67, 69f). There was a sobering recognition that higher spending on
education on the input side of schooling did not necessarily affect the quality of
achievement on the output side of education (p. 72).7 Two major reports in 1983 testified to
the ultimate need for educational reform using the catchword ‘‘excellence.’’ One of the
reports was the famous federal government report, ‘‘A Nation at Risk,’’ by the National
Commission on Excellence in Education (National Commission 1983), and the other was
the Education Commission of the States’ report, ‘‘Action for Excellence: A Comprehensive
Plan to Improve Our Nation’s Schools’’ (Task Force 1983). Both reports started by
assessing an economic decline of U.S. industry as compared to other national industries
and then connected the economic slide to the decline of education.8 The success of the
reports was impressive; a broad campaign for improving education was on its way, with
millions of dollars to be invested. However, the efforts failed to a large degree, and the
hopes placed in education were being disappointed once more.
What happened around the time of the end of the Cold War is intriguing and decisive for
today’s educational policy in the world. The poor results of the reform attempts did not
lead the experts to reexamine their basic hopes and assumptions about the school and
6 And indeed, in the 1960s and 1970s the experts published national reports on the progress of educational
policy (for a summary of the first reports, see OECD 1979).
7 Accordingly, they looked for other variables, which were then summed up in one: ‘‘the hard work
variable’’ (Lerner 1982, p. 72), a value that represented the conservative Reagan era best.
8 ‘‘In the seventies, productivity in manufacturing industries grew nearly four times as fast in Japan, and
twice as fast in West Germany and France, as in the United States’’ (Task Force 1983, p. 13). ‘‘We live
among determined, well-educated, and strongly motivated competitors. We compete with them for inter-
national standing and markets, not only with products but also with the ideas of our laboratories and
neighborhood workshops. America’s position in the world may once have been reasonably secure with only
a few exceptionally well-trained men and women. It is no longer’’ (National Commission 1983, p. 6).
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education. Instead, they sought new strategies to improve the quality of education by
enhancing the influence of the experts. In contrast to the decades before, the strategies were
not headed towards improving the input—that is to say, improving teaching quality, cur-
riculum, or textbooks—but instead aimed at changing the governance structure of the
school in order to improve the quality. In the eyes of the experts, it was actually the locally
elected school boards that were the culprits in the failing reforms and not the reform
concepts themselves.
The accusation that the local school boards were the major cause of failing reforms
signified a dramatic clash between the idea of an elite democracy and the local democracy,
or between expertise and common sense. The experts did not vacillate, and they declared
the local school boards to be ‘‘living fossils of an earlier age’’ (Finn 1991, p. 32). The
influence of those fossils should be restricted in order to reach a new balance between state
government with its experts and the individual school in order to push through the reform
programs by means of incentives. Therefore, more focus should be placed on output
(testing results) than on input, as previously. The state governments would then serve as
monitoring agencies and in this way ensure that state guidelines are met.9 Accordingly,
David Conley, director of the Center for Educational Policy Research, states that the school
boards will serve the state government and its experts rather than the local schools by
helping the former to increase the accountability of the individual schools, and if they fail
to do so, they should be passed over by the state (Conley 2003, p. 146). It is this expert
ideology and its strategy of bypassing the local authorities by isolating the single schools in
order to make them accountable to the central authorities that is in the background of the
PISA program, neglecting real contexts of schooling. The euphemist notion of that process
is called the autonomy of the single schools.10
This ideology of reducing local democracy and increasing central experts on the one
hand, and governing by financial incentives to motivate the single schools for better
achievement on the other, became the major ideology for the No Child Left Behind Act
signed by George W. Bush in 2001. The Act obligated schools to achieve minimum
standards in three tested subjects, mathematics, science, and language.11 The very same
outline was used by the OECD. In contrast to the federal government of the United States,
the incentive of OECD is not monetary but instead draws on national(istic) passions, as we
may detect for instance in Germany’s reaction: ‘‘The aim is clear: 10 years from now
Germany has to belong to the five leading educational countries. That is why our school
system has to bring our children and adolescents to higher education, to higher proficiency
level, and social competencies. That is exactly what happens in Finland and Canada. These
countries have to be our measuring stick’’ (Bildungsministerium 2003, cited in Oelkers
2004, p. 33).
9 This move correlates with the rise of the neo-classical theories in economics, superseding Keynesianism
and the idea of the welfare state in the 1980s. The ‘‘swearword’’ of this school is ‘‘neo-liberalism’’ (see
Hartwich 2009). However, the persuasiveness of this ideology weakened considerably in the economic crisis
of 2008/2009, when the national governments in the world had to support private banks with billions of
dollars paid by taxpayers.
10 For a discussion about how this shift towards the single school can conflict with the idea of democracy
see Biesta 2004.
11 With the little Post-Cold War specification that the science results are not counted (see Garmoran 2007).
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Schooling, the Culture of Testing, and the Role of Educational Research
The autonomy of the single schools to achieve minimum standards in a few selected fields
defined by experts has become the global model of school reform.12 The unconsidered
recognition of this American policy shift from input steering to output steering by OECD
and European experts raises some questions, for it is by no means the only solution. It
might be unique, but it is by no means a universal model. It is a result of the millennial
ambitions in the Cold War that became educationalized in the early 1960s in a context in
which the federal government had no direct instrument for intervening in educational
affairs at all. To a European it is inconceivable that an American president, as the most
powerful man in the world, could not be able to direct any school between Maine and
California to use a specific textbook in the classroom or to increase the weekly school
hours even by 10 min. In other words: The American model of expert-driven standardized
assessment of autonomous schools, with an equivalent incentive system, only makes sense
where central experts feel the need to undermine locally elected authorities. Hence, this
model is as culturally encoded as any other. It is a result of a particular historical process in
a specific cultural setting. That the agents of this model claim it to be universal, and free of
concrete circumstances and ideologies, does not help the matter. Rather, it is no more than
the expression of this very cultural ideology.
It is not incomprehensible that many policy makers in Europe were attracted by this
ideology, sponsored corresponding research projects, and drew pertinent conclusions
contributing to the educational world polity. Quickly they enlarged the administration
departments of education with the addition of experts. In Zurich, for example, in the
30 years between 1973 and 2003 the number of the staff was quadrupled (Tro¨hler 2008).
However, the policy makers often forgot that in contrast to the United States, they do have
relevant steering power to enhance schooling in their country, instruments and means in
accordance with their culturally embedded school system with its idiosyncrasy. How
deeply effective these cultural understandings, institutions, and practices are has hardly
been evaluated so far. This is astonishing, for the materializations of these cultures are just
around the corner. One recent study (Overesch 2007) examined these cultures by com-
paring the Finnish and German educational policies using quantitative and qualitative
methods. It found that despite the primacy of the Finnish system, it should not be copied by
the Germans. Why not? The author says: ‘‘The most surprising result of the analysis is:
Institutions in terms of historical experiences and cultural character are more important for
the decision-making processes than institutions in terms of the decision rules’’ (Overesch
2007, p. 256). The naı¨ve assumption of the planning ideology according to which there is,
first, an existing problem that, second, has to be solved in a process is being reversed. The
problems are results of the historically grown decision-making processes, and they, in turn,
emerge from long-time cultural experiences (p. 257). Therefore the author traces the
success of the Finnish system back to a cooperative and non-partisan culture in the Finnish
society that allows a pragmatic educational policy. It is precisely this culture that is
identified as the reason for the success in PISA, a culture that differs to a great degree from
12 The notion of ‘‘global model of school reform’’ does not refer to one single model implemented in every
country in the world but to the ideological accordance between the global players such as the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, or the UNESCO about how education should be organized. Countries less
exposed to the need of financial aid by these players are of course more likely to defend their culturally
idiosyncratic idea of schooling.
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the German culture.13 In other words, one can transfer formal structures but not cultural
experiences that result in idiosyncratic attitudes predefining specific circumstances as
problems and equally predefining the pertinent solutions to these problems. It is this
historical cultural legacy that causes the phenomenon that the critics I mentioned in the
introduction were describing—namely, that the global harmonization is limited to formal
structures and does not get to the inner activities of education.
With this, I by no means advocate pessimism about the development of the schools
neither do I reject large-scale assessments. My question is directed to the rather funda-
mental question of how research in education is characterized best in its traditional
institutions of research, the university, in a time when non-university research institutions
promote educational research oriented towards political and/or economical goals. Ante-
cedent to the existence of these non-university research institutions educational research
was excluded from all three, the millennial ambitions in the Cold War, its educational
metamorphosis in the 1960s, and the turnaround to quality and output steering in the wake
of the end of the Cold War in 1989. Now it has been invited to participate in the new
governance culture, generating data according to the hardly legitimated standards and
norms that pretend to be free of ideology and free of the specific cultures that students live
in. However, this invitation to participate in the construction of ‘‘One World’’ is not solely
a friendly act, for the agents of this new governance do not handle educational research
with kid gloves. Obviously annoyed by the hesitation of research to become the helping
hand of the new governance culture, OECD started to assess (paradoxically, with the help
of international experts quite familiar with university research) the contributions of edu-
cational research in universities to policy makers in the different countries. In the case of
Switzerland it was said: The ‘‘political and administrative entities are increasingly in need
of scientific findings as a basis for decision-making; they also define research desiderata
and commission specific research projects and studies. One question in this regard is
whether the education sciences practised in Switzerland are capable of generating the
governance knowledge required by policymakers and administrators while adequately
addressing the issues that are of concern to educational practitioners.’’ (OECD/CERI 2006,
p. 5).
The same conflict occurred regarding economy and science in the early days of the
OEEC (the predecessor of OECD) in 1948. Concerned with the enhancement of science for
the sake of technological progress in order to implement the Marshall Plan in Europe and at
the same time to fight communism, a scientific committee with tasks for both basic and
applied research in economy and technology was being planned. However, at the first
meeting the political stakeholders of the OEEC downgraded this committee to a ‘‘Working
Party on Scientific and Technical Information.’’ The frustration of the attendant scholars
was enormous. As the then-member Alexander King reported in 2001, the Swedish col-
league made a plea to live with this downgrade to supply information rather than to do
research: ‘‘While we all regret that our task appears to have been narrowed to scientific
information, does it really matter? After all, it is research, that generates information, and
industry that applies it.’’ In 1963, on the basis of the very same conflict, the Dutch Minister
of Education accused the science policy of the OECD of fostering the ‘‘prostitution of
science’’ (King 2001, pp. 340, 343). These conflicts stood at the outset of the dichotomy
between expert-driven and primarily academic research altogether, and it seems that today
13 ‘‘The German Bundesla¨nder have a totally different way of decision making in the fields of policy.
Different values, experiences, interests, and styles of negotiation dominate the political class, which prevents
fundamentally a consensual and pragmatic policy style’’ (Overesch 2007, p. 267 freely translated here).
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this conflict has reached the field of educational research: Expert-driven research tries to
usurp academic research, whereas some exponents of the latter seem to be attracted by the
alleged political power of the former.
Whatever this conflict will bring about, it becomes quite obvious that the OECD—based
on a very meager educational theory of human capital—applies and contributes to a global
system of communication about education in which numbers are performed with the
pretension to cut off any subjectivity or particularity (Popkewitz 2009). By meeting these
demands, however, academic research runs the risk of losing its academic legitimation: If
research, namely, primarily contributes to this communication about education—sure
enough in good faith to enhance school quality—it will foremost help to suggest a globally
standardized reality that is representable by numbers. Suggesting this standardized reality,
or the harmonized globe, however, automatically prevents research on the different idio-
syncratic empirical realities, and the standardized empirical research setting ironically
becomes un-empirical. But these realities do exist, and they are—as we have seen in even
quite similar cultures such as Finland and Germany (both are Lutheran-dominated cul-
tures)—characterized by cultural differences even in what is perceived to be a problem,
let alone the solutions. If we become aware of the cultural significance of the homecoming
queen in an American high school, or the role of ministrant in a Catholic context, or the
fact that a coach of an American college football team can earn as much as 2 million
dollars a year, then we start to realize that questions of quality are always related to broad
cultural expectations about the child, the soul, the future citizen, social justice, and peace.
These multiple realities are historical products that we need to retrace in order to under-
stand them. This is the ultimate purpose of educational history—educational history not
understood as the story of the past but rather as the story up to the present. This power of
the silent actors in educational policy, the historically grown cultural expectations that
affect—directly and indirectly—the constructions of education in their discursive and
organizational appearances, have certainly not been considered enough. To do this in an
international comparative way under omission of a de-contextualized and globalized ter-
tium comparitionis is a project that against this background almost suggests itself. Where
else than in small countries such as Luxembourg is one led to become involved in such a
project?
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